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I.

INTRODUCTION

Addressing climate change will require a suite of policies and pro1
grams . . . .
Historically, environmental regulation in the United States has
occurred piecemeal, reflecting the diverse positions on the topic taken by state legislators, state and federal agencies, the courts, and other
stakeholders. Current initiatives to reduce or to regulate carbon are
2
no different, as they involve varying levels of regulation and oversight.
Even with the passage of a federal cap-and-trade law this complex
regulatory structure will not change. As such, public utilities and others in the energy sector can expect to be regulated at many different
3
levels for the purpose of restricting carbon output.
1. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 26,266
(Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89).
2. See id.
3. While carbon regulation will apply to many different areas of industry, this
article will focus on the impact resulting from regulation on public utilities providing
retail electricity service to customers. While each state has a slightly different defini-
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In particular, public utilities are rate regulated, which requires
4
approval of intrastate retail rates by the state regulatory commission
that has jurisdiction over its rates and services. Rate regulation is of
particular significance where compliance with carbon regulations
creates additional costs for public utilities. With few exceptions, carbon regulations do not address a critical driver for a public utility—
who will bear responsibility to pay for the additional expense resulting
from such regulation? In the absence of a clear mandate, the answer
is left open to debate in the hundreds of regulatory and judicial proceedings that will ensue. Where a public utility operates in multiple
states, it may also experience different regulatory treatment of these
costs, creating disparity between different jurisdictions and challenges
for the public utility’s resource planning and financial integrity.
Costs resulting from the generation of electricity, such as fuel and
generating facilities, are considered part of the operating costs of providing that service to customers. In the context of a retail rate setting
proceeding, a state regulatory commission’s role is to consider whether the rates identified by the requesting public utility are just and rea5
sonable, and to establish a reasonable return on investment.
Current estimates of the costs associated with carbon regulation
compliance are significant, and consequently could result in requests
by public utilities for correspondingly significant increases in retail

tion, a “public utility” is typically defined as “a diverse group of businesses that have
been subjected over several decades to detailed local, state and federal regulation of
rates and service.” CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 4
(3d ed. 1993). Public utilities can generally be divided into two categories: (1) “those
enterprises which supply, directly or indirectly, continuous or repeated services
through more or less permanent physical connection between the [generation] plant
. . . and the premises of the consumer;” and (2) transportation entities. Id. See also
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES RATES 10 (2d ed. 1988)
(stating that “an enterprise is not regarded as a public utility, at least for the most
part, unless the regulation to which it is subject includes direct control of its rates of
charge for services and a limitation on its allowed rate of return”). The focus of this
article will be on the first type of public utility.
4. State agencies with the legislative authority to regulate rates, facilities and
services of private utilities offering retail service are called by a variety of different
names depending on the individual state (e.g., Public Utilities Commission, Public
Service Commission, Public Regulation Commission, Board of Public Utilities, etc.).
This article will generically refer to these entities as “state regulatory commissions.”
5. See, e.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006) (“All rates and charges
made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be
just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 9

2010]

WHO PAYS FOR CARBON COSTS?

907

rates. If the public utility does not recover the cost of carbon regulation through its rates, these costs reduce the public utility’s earnings
and shareholders initially bear the reduced earnings. The public utility’s profitability, however, impacts its ability to remain investmentworthy and to borrow capital at reasonable terms for investment in its
systems and services. While disallowing carbon costs may initially mitigate a rate impact for electricity customers, this option also has consequences that are magnified by the expected size of the necessary
rate increase. Customers will ultimately feel degradation in the public
utility’s credit status through increases in other costs or in the quality
of the service provided.
Additionally, increased regulatory risk and uncertainty for public
utilities can have a chilling effect on its capital investment. Where
costs for carbon regulation are not recovered in rates, it could have a
corresponding impact on investment in new technologies that are necessary to substantively address the issue of climate change. In these
instances, the negative effects of regulatory uncertainty will not only
be felt by public utilities, their customers and shareholders, but are
ultimately likely to harm the environmental cause that the carbon policy is meant to help.
This article addresses the types of cost resulting from carbon regulation and discusses how they should be treated for ratemaking purposes. First, a summary is provided of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment report that found
6
global warming to be “unequivocal.” The article next considers various carbon initiatives from different branches of government and at
both the state and federal levels. The article then considers cost recovery for these different carbon costs under fundamental ratemaking
7
principles. The article concludes that carbon costs and its impacts
8
should be dealt with comprehensively and consistently.
II. THE IPCC STATES THAT GLOBAL WARMING IS “U NEQUIVOCAL”
9

In 2007, the IPCC published its Fourth Assessment Report. In
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Parts III, IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a scientific body
that reviews scientific, technical, and socio-economic information in an effort to understand global climate change. See IPCC, Organization, www.ipcc.ch/organization/
organization.htm (last visited on Mar. 28, 2010). The IPCC was established in 1989 by
the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization. See IPCC, History, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.htm
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that report, the IPCC concluded that global warming is “unequivocal”
10
and that human activity “very likely” has caused a rise in global tem11
The report explained that the “primary
peratures since 1950.
source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
since the pre-industrial period results from fossil fuel use, with land12
use change providing another significant but smaller contribution.”
At the time of the report, the United States accounted for five percent
of the world’s population, but contributed a quarter of greenhouse
13
gas emissions.
Based on these conclusions, the IPCC recommended a number
of adaptation and mitigation strategies. Among them, and most relevant here, the IPCC recommended that the energy sector adapt by
strengthening energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable
resources, while reducing dependence on a single source of energy—
14
fossil fuels. The IPCC suggested that this could be accomplished by
“[n]ational energy policies, regulations, and fiscal and financial in15
centives to encourage uses of alternative sources.” The IPCC noted
that this adaption strategy could stimulate new technologies and use
local resources, but there could also be technological and financial
(last visited on Mar. 28, 2010). The Organization’s first report was published in 1990.
Id. The IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 (jointly with former U.S. Vice President Al Gore) for its efforts “to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about
man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measurers that are
needed to counteract such change.” Ole Danbolt Mjos, Chairman, The Norwegian
Nobel Committee, Presentation Speech (Dec. 10, 2007), http://nobelpeaceprize
.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2007/presentation-2007.
10. The IPCC’s 2007 report was the first to conclude that human activity was
“very likely,” or greater than ninety percent, a cause of global warming. The 2007
report is available on the IPCC website. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC PHYSICAL REPORT]. In
previous IPCC reports, human activity was only sixty-six to ninety percent “likely,” a
cause of global warming. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 27 (2008),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT].
11. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 5, 10 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf [hereinafter
IPCC 2007 SUMMARY]. See also Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel
Calls Global Warming ‘Unequivocal,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1.
12. IPCC PHYSICAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
13. See Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 11, at 2.
14. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 15 tbl. 4.1. The IPCC also recommended strengthening the transmission and distribution infrastructure. Id. Strengthening the transmission and distribution infrastructure is critical as more renewable
resources come on to the system.
15. Id.
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16

barriers. To mitigate global warming, the IPCC recommended “fuel
switching from coal to [natural] gas; nuclear power; renewable heat
and power (hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal[,] and bioenergy);
17
combined heat and power,” and carbon sequestration. The IPCC
recommended that these mitigation strategies could be accomplished
by carbon charges on fossil fuels and renewable energy obligations,
18
among other policies.
The 111th Congress relied in part on these IPCC conclusions
when drafting carbon regulation legislation in 2009. Among the congressional findings for American Clean Energy and Security (ACES)
Act’s Global Warming Pollution Reduction Program, Congress found:
(1) Global warming poses a significant threat to the national security, economy, public health and welfare,
and environment of the United States, as well as of other nations.
(2) Reviews of scientific studies, including by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National
Academy of Sciences, demonstrate that global warming
is the result of the combined anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from numerous sources of all types
and sizes. Each increment of emission, when combined
with other emissions, causes or contributes materially to
the acceleration and extent of global warming and its
adverse effects for the lifetime of such gas in the atmosphere. Accordingly, controlling emissions in small
as well as large amounts is essential to prevent, slow the
pace of, reduce the threats from, and mitigate global
19
warming and its adverse effects.
The ACES bill used many of the adaptation and mitigation strat20
egies listed in the IPCC report.
III. CARBON REDUCTION INITIATIVES IN ALL BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT CREATE UNEQUIVOCAL CARBON-RELATED COSTS
Various forms of carbon initiatives impacting the energy sector
have been commenced by a variety of stakeholders. All of these initiatives create new carbon-related costs—from civil litigation costs and
16. Id.
17. Id. at tbl. 4.2.
18. Id.
19. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
701(a)(1)–(2) (2009).
20. See discussion of ACES infra Part III.B.
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potential damages to compliance-related costs— but few of the initiatives explicitly provide for cost recovery or explain how these new carbon-related costs will be recovered.
A. Climate Change Litigation
Climate change litigation, specifically whether plaintiffs can
maintain a cause of action against oil, energy, and public utilities for
adverse effects of global warming, create massive potential costs to
21
comply with an injunction or civil damages awards. Two United
States Courts of Appeals found that tort liability for global warming is
a justiciable political question and that plaintiffs have standing to
22
maintain a cause of action against oil, energy, and utility companies.
23
One federal district court disagreed.
If the plaintiffs ultimately prevail, the defendant public utilities
may be ordered to reduce or eliminate carbon emissions associated
with the electricity it provides to customers. Compliance with such an
order may require the public utility to incur substantial costs, including purchase of alternative carbon neutral power to meet customer
demand, and eventually the replacement of existing electric genera24
tion resources that emit carbon.

21. This article does not address whether civil damages for carbon emissions
should be included in the cost of service when setting retail rates; but the magnitude
of such costs for a public utility may be considerable. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, States
Settle With Plant Polluting Region’s Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A25 (explaining
that Duke Energy settled a case about the sulfur dioxide emissions from one coal
plant by paying a $1.75 million civil penalty, committing to spend $80 million to reduce the coal plant’s emissions and an additional $6.25 million on other environmental projects).
22. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. See infra Part III.A.2.
24. For example, if the public utility relies on electricity generated from its own
carbon-emitting generation plants, it would have to purchase carbon-neutral replacement power to continue serving its customers while it prepares to retrofit or replace these carbon-emitting generation plants with other carbon-neutral generation
resources. Replacement power may cost more than the electricity from its current
generation plants, and any physical changes to its own generation plant would also
involve new costs. If the public utility purchases all of its electricity for resale, it would
have to negotiate new contracts for carbon-neutral resources, while possibly remaining under contract obligations for its existing resources.
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1. Courts of Appeals hold Global Warming Claims are Justiciable
and Plaintiffs have Standing: Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Company Inc. and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA
25

In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company Inc., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that eight states, New York City, and
three land trusts had standing to bring federal common law nuisance
26
claims against several public utilities that own and operate coal-fired
power plants and that such a nuisance claim did not present a nonjusticiable political question. The plaintiffs sought to cap and then
27
reduce the defendant’s carbon emissions.
In 2004, the plaintiffs filed two separate actions against the public
utilities. In both actions, the plaintiffs asserted that the public utilities
were “substantial contributors to elevated levels of carbon dioxide
28
and global warming.” Citing the causal link between heightened
greenhouse gases and global warming, the states and New York City
predicted that global warming “will have substantial adverse impacts
on their environments, residents, and property, and that it will cost
29
billions of dollars to respond to these problems.” The land trusts
complaint was similar, but alleged a different type of injury—the land
trusts argued that global warming would “diminish or destroy the particular ecological and aesthetic values that caused [them] to acquire,
and cause them to maintain, the properties they hold in trust” and
25. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). The
other court of appeals case is Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
In Comer, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that residents and owners of land
and property along the Mississippi Golf coast have standing to assert Mississippi state
law public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against various energy, fossil fuel, and chemical industries that operate in Mississippi, and that such
claims do not present non-justiciable political questions. Id. at 860. In Comer, the
plaintiffs sought damages from the defendants for private property that was destroyed
during Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 863. Comer will not be discussed in detail because
the plaintiffs requested damages, as opposed to an injunction, and the Fifth Circuit’s
conclusion is similar to the AEP court. The defendants in AEP and Comer have since
requested en banc review. The Fifth Circuit granted en banc review on March 1, 2010.
26. Specifically, these utilities are American Electric Power Company Inc., American Electric Power Service Corporation, Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation. American Electric Power Service
Corporation is the service company for American Electric Power Company Inc.; the
service company provides management and professional services for AEP’s operating
companies, but the service company does not generate carbon dioxide emissions.
AEP, 582 F.3d at 316 n.1.
27. Id. at 314.
28. Id. at 316–18 (states’ and New York City’s claims); id. at 318–19 (land trusts’
claims).
29. Id. at 317.
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would “interfer[e] with their efforts to preserve ecologically significant and sensitive land for scientific and educational purposes, and
30
for human use and enjoyment.”
The Southern District of New York dismissed both complaints,
31
finding that the case presented a non-justiciable political question.
In so holding, the court relied heavily on the third factor of the politi32
cal question inquiry provided in Baker v. Carr. The third Baker factor
suggests there is a non-justiciable political question when it is “impossib[le] [to] decid[e] without an initial policy determination of a kind
33
clearly for non-judicial discretion.” The district court held that initial policy determinations had to be made by the elected branches of
34
government before a court could adjudicate the case. The district
court did not address directly the standing issue because of its deter35
mination on the political question.
More than three years after oral argument, the Second Circuit
decided the case, overruling the district court and finding that the
plaintiffs had standing to bring nuisance claims against the public util36
ities. The court started its analysis of the political question doctrine
37
by noting that “Baker set a high bar for non-justiciability.” The court
38
then analyzed all six of the Baker factors. The court’s analysis focused on the second and third Baker factors —that is, whether there
was a lack of judicially-discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the case and whether it was impossible to decide the case
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
The public utilities argued that neither public nuisance cases nor
39
the Second Restatement of Torts provided guidance on the potential
30. Id. at 319.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 319–20 (discussing the district court’s application of the factors outlined in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)).
33. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 319 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
34. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
35. Id. at 271 n.6.
36. AEP, 582 F.3d at 315. The Honorable Justice Sonia Sotomayor was a member
of the panel who considered the AEP case, but was appointed to the U.S. Supreme
Court before the case was decided. The case was therefore decided only by the two
remaining members of the panel. Id. at 314 n.*.
37. Id. at 321.
38. Id. at 323–32. When a Baker factor is present, it suggests a non-justiciable political question.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
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40

complex issues in global warming–related nuisance cases. The court
disagreed, citing cases where federal courts “grappled with complex
scientific evidence, and resolved the issues presented, based on a fully
41
developed record.” The court held that “[w]ell-settled principles of
tort and public nuisance law provide appropriate guidance to the district court in assessing Plaintiffs’ claims and the federal courts are
42
competent to deal with these issues.”
The court of appeals also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the elected branches needed to make an initial policy determination on the case. The court of appeals relied on Illinois v. City
43
of Milwaukee, finding that if a federal statute, like the Clean Air Act,
does not provide the plaintiffs with a remedy, the plaintiff does not
have to wait for Congress to enact comprehensive legislation that pro44
vides a remedy. Instead, the plaintiff can rely on the federal com45
mon law. After reviewing the other Baker factors, the court held
“that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaints on the
46
ground that they presented non-justiciable political questions.”
47
The court next addressed the standing issues. Under Lujan v.
48
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court provided a three-part test for
standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact —an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
40. AEP, 582 F.3d at 326.
41. Id. at 327 (citing New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1851)).
42. Id. at 329.
43. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
44. AEP, 582 F.3d at 330–31.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 332.
47. The court first addressed the States’s parens patriae standing. To have parens
patriae standing, “[a] state: (1) ‘must articulate an interest apart from the interests of
particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party’; (2) ‘must
express a quasi-sovereign interest’; and (3) must have ‘alleged injury to a sufficiently
substantial segment of its population.’” Id. at 335–36 (citing Snapp v. Puerto Rico ex
rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). The court found that the States met the test for
parens patriae standing. Id. at 338. The court’s analysis will not be detailed in this article because the plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina, discussed infra Part III.2, are
not states.
48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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of —the injury has to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
49
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
The court found that all of the plaintiffs satisfied the injury in
50
fact prong of the Lujan test. Only one state, California, showed a
51
current injury in fact. The rest of the states, New York City and the
land trusts all alleged a future injury. For example, the states with
ocean coastline and New York City argued that the rise in sea level
caused by global warming will lead to more floods resulting in damage
52
to infrastructure. The court included a quotation from Massachusetts
53
v. Environmental Protection Agency, in order to explain that incremental injuries did not foreclose finding an injury in fact: “Petitioners [in
Massachusetts v. EPA] maintain that the seas are rising and will continue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of Massachusetts’ sovereign territory. No one, save perhaps the dissenters,
54
disputes those allegations. Our cases require nothing more.” The
court further concluded that the risk of catastrophic harm to the
plaintiffs, though remote, was real and therefore the plaintiffs suffi55
ciently alleged a future injury.
Regarding causation, the court noted that causation required for
standing is not a tort-like causation requirement; instead, the injury
56
must be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendants. Both
sides relied on Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
57
Duffryn Terminals, Inc. and its progeny. In Powell Duffryn, the court
provided a three-part test to determine whether an injury is fairly traceable to a defendant’s discharge of pollutants:
[T]his likelihood may be established by showing that a defendant has (1) discharged some pollutant in concentra49. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 339 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations omitted)).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 341. The State of California alleged reduced snowpack and asserted
that the reduced snowpack negatively impacted water supplies and caused floodrelated property damage. Id. at 341.
52. Id. at 342.
53. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
54. AEP, 582 F.3d at 344 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S.
497, 523 n.21 (2007)).
55. Id. at 344.
56. Id. at 345.
57. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
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tions greater than allowed by its permit (2) into a waterway
in which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant and that (3) this pollutant
causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the
58
plaintiffs.
The defendants tried to distinguish Powell Duffryn based on the
first prong of the test. The court rejected the defendant’s argument
and held that the causation element was met in that case because the
59
defendants contributed to the types of injuries alleged. Finally, the
court found that the plaintiffs’ claims satisfied the redressibility prong
of the standing test because the reduction of domestic emissions
60
would slow the pace of global emissions.
The court then analyzed the defendant public utilities’ Rule
12(b)(6) motion. The court found that all of the plaintiffs stated
claims under the federal common law of nuisance. The court therefore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case
61
for further proceedings.
2. Federal District Court holds Global Warming Claims are not
Justiciable under the Political Question Doctrine and Plaintiffs do not
have Standing: Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corporation
In contrast to AEP and Comer, the Northern District of California
dismissed a climate change claim in Native Village of Kivalina v. Ex62
xonMobil Corporation. In that case, the governing body of an Inupiat
Eskimo village and the City of Kivalina (collectively, the Kivalina Plaintiffs) filed suit against twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies
63
(collectively, the Kivalina Defendants).
The Kivalina Plaintiffs
58. AEP, 582 F.3d at 346 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72).
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id. at 347–49.
61. The court of appeals also found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced
by federal law and that the discretionary function exception does not provide one of
the defendants, the Tennessee Valley Authority, with immunity from suit. See id. at
371–92. The displacement theory is discussed infra Part III.D. The Tennessee Valley
Authority’s claim need not be discussed for the purposes of this article.
62. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction at 7, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 08-CV-01138, (N.D.
Cal. granted Sept. 30, 2009). The Native Village of Kivalina has filed a notice of appeal.
63. Id. at 1. The defendants in the Kivalina case were: (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP America, Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5)
Chevron Corporation; (6) Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7) ConocoPhillips Company; (8)
Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C.; (9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy Corporation;
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sought damages under a nuisance theory, asserting that the Kivalina
Defendants’ emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
had caused global warming. The Kivalina Plaintiffs argued that, as a
result of global warming, the sea ice that protects the City of Kivalina
is thinner and less extensive than it was previously, making the City
64
uninhabitable and necessitating the relocation of its residents.
The Kivalina Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of sub65
ject matter jurisdiction. The Kivalina Defendants argued that the
claims were not justiciable under the political question doctrine and
that the Kivalina Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the
66
67
U.S. Constitution. The court agreed.
In considering whether the Kivalina Plaintiffs’ claim presented a
political question, the court considered the factors provided in Baker
68
69
v. Carr, as synthesized under Wang v. Masaitis:
Justice Powell distilled the Baker test into three inquiries:
“(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand
that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii)
Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial inter70
vention?”
(11) The AES Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Corporation; (13) American Electric Power Services Corporation; (14) DTE Energy Company; (15) Duke
Energy Corporation; (16) Dynergy Holdings, Inc.; (17) Edison International; (18)
Mid-American Energy Holdings Company; (19) Mirant Corporation; (20) NRG Energy; (21) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (22) Reliant Energy, Inc.; (23) The
Southern Company; and (24) Xcel Energy Inc. Id. at n.1.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id. at 7 (discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Under Baker v. Carr,
any of the following demonstrate that the issue is a non-justiciable political question:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
management standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
69. 416 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
998 (1979)).
70. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863, 872 (N.D.
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Under the first inquiry, the Kivalina Defendants argued that
global warming was a foreign policy issue and therefore resolution of
the issue would interfere with the political branches’ authority over
71
foreign policy. The court found that global warming was not exclusively a foreign policy issue and therefore resolution of the issue was
not conclusively within the authority of the political branches of gov72
ernment.
The court concluded that the case was non-justiciable under the
second inquiry relating to judicial expertise. The Kivalina Plaintiffs
first argued that the law provided judicially discoverable and manageable standards because the standards are the same for all nuisance
cases—the court must determine “whether Defendants contributed
73
to ‘an unreasonable interference with public rights.’” The court
disagreed because resolution of a nuisance claim requires “weighing
74
‘the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.’” The
court reasoned that the case would require weighing “the energyproducing alternatives that were available in the past and consider
their respective impact on far ranging issues such as reliability as an
energy source, safety considerations and the impact of the different
alternatives on consumers and business at every level” with the “benefits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing greenhouse gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along
75
the coast of a remote Alaskan locale.” The court concluded that
there were no judicially discoverable or manageable standards to
76
guide the fact-finder in making a decision on this issue.
The Kivalina Plaintiffs next argued that air and water pollution
cases create judicially discoverable or manageable standards. The
court disagreed with the reasoning of the AEP court, finding that the
well-settled principles of tort and public nuisance law do not provide
sufficient guidance to decide the case. The court distinguished global
warming cases from other environmental cases tried under a tort or
nuisance theory. In those cases, there were “a discrete number of
‘polluters’ that were identified as causing a specific injury to a specific
77
area.” Further, the sequence of events leading up to other enviCal. 2009) (quoting Wang, 416 F.3d at 995).
71. Id. at 872–73.
72. Id. at 873.
73. Id. at 874 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Motion in Opposition at 63).
74. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. e (1979)).
75. Id. at 874–75.
76. Id. at 875.
77. Id.
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78

ronmental litigation cases was more direct. Because the court found
that there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards,
the court concluded that the case presented a political question and
was non-justiciable; thus the court did not consider the third inquiry
of the political question doctrine.
On the issue of standing, the court found that the case did not
79
meet the causation requirement for standing. The damage caused
to the Kivalina coastline through global warming is attributable to
many entities over the course of hundreds of years. The court explained that the Kivalina Defendants were not the seed of the Kivalina
Plaintiffs’ injury, and therefore found that the case lacked Article III
80
standing.
B. Federal Legislation—American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
Although the federal courts have been considering the issue of
responsibility for climate change in the absence of a federal policy,
Congress proposed legislation in 2009 that ultimately intended to codify such policy and create a regulatory structure aimed at reducing
81
the amount of carbon emitted in the United States. If enacted, such
legislation would result in new costs stemming from the regulation of
carbon emissions, but does not appear to completely preclude the risk
82
of injunction from the type of litigation summarized above.

78. Id. at 875–76 (citing Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v.
E.P.A., 410 F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a discharge in excess of the
amount prescribed is presumed harmful in a water pollution case)).
79. Id. at 877–82. To have Article III standing a plaintiff must establish
an injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a “legally
protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e., a “‘fairly . . . trace[able]’” connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressibility (i.e., it is “‘likely’” and not “merely ‘speculative’” that the plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks
in bringing suit).
Id. at 877 (citing Sprint Comm’n Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535
(2008)).
80. Id. at 880–81.
81. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 111TH CONG., DISCUSSION
DRAFT SUMMARY, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY & SECURITY ACT OF 2009 1 (2009).
82. Nevertheless, by Congress setting caps on greenhouse gas emissions, if ACES
passes, one can make a stronger case for dismissing such litigation on the basis of a
political question, as there is no longer a political vacuum on this issue. Sally Roberts,
More Public Nuisance Suits Could Arise from Recent Court Decisions, BUS. INS., Nov. 23,
2009, at 18, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091122/
ISSUE03/311229994.
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ACES Generally

H.R. 2454 — the America Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(ACES) —passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 219–
83
211 on June 26, 2009. The bill is best known for its cap-and-trade
system, discussed below. The bill also requires public utilities who
generate electricity to provide a certain percentage of their load with
electricity from renewable resources (i.e., a renewable energy standard), and encourages use of “smart grid” and carbon capture and
84
sequestration technologies. Reducing emissions and complying with
renewable energy standards in ACES will create considerable costs for
public utilities.
2.

The Cap and Trade System under ACES

The cap-and-trade system under ACES covers emissions from
electric utilities and other entities that account for eighty-five percent
of emissions in the United States. The system provides allowances to
85
covered entities, thereby allowing them to emit a certain amount of
86
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs). Covered enti87
ties can also offset their carbon emissions.
a. Allowances
Under ACES, covered entities would need allowances to emit
GHGs. An allowance is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent
88
of GHGs. ACES specifically prescribes the number of allowances
89
available for each calendar year. If ACES were enacted, the cap and

83. At the time of publication, the U.S. Senate had not acted on ACES. Accordingly, this article only considers the bill as approved by the House.
84. Details of ACES’s renewable energy standards, smart grid, and carbon capture and sequestration policies are beyond the scope of this article.
85. American Clean Energy and Security Act [ACES], H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
700(13) (2009).
86. Section 711(a) defines greenhouse gases to include: “(1) Carbon dioxide.
(2) Methane. (3) Nitrous oxide. (4) Sulfur hexafluoride. (5) Hyprofluorocarbons
[emitted] from a chemical manufacturing process at an industrial stationary source.
(6) Any perfluorocarbon. (7) Nitrogen trifluoride[,] [and] (8) Any other anthropogenic gas designated as a greenhouse gas by the [EPA] Administrator under this section.” § 711(a)(1)–(8).
87. § 732.
88. Each GHG listed in note 86 is expressed in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents. For example, one metric ton of methane is equal to twenty-five metric tons of
carbon dioxide. See § 712 (b)(1).
89. § 721.
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trade system would start in 2012, covering emissions from electric generators, refiners and importers of electric fuel, and fluorinated gas
90
manufacturers. In 2014, industrial stationary sources would be added to the cap and trade system, and natural gas local distribution
91
companies would be added to the program in 2016. Emissions allowances would decrease each year and, in 2050, level off to 17% of
92
the quantity of GHG emissions in 2005. This would translate to an
83% percent reduction of GHGs from 2005 levels.
Emissions Allowances by Year under ACES
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In addition to prescribing the number of allowances available,
93
ACES also prescribes to whom the allowances will be allocated. Under ACES, the majority of the allowances would be allocated to specific stakeholders in 2012, when the cap and trade system is proposed to
start. By 2030, approximately 25% of the allowances would be allocated to specific stakeholders; the rest of the allowances would be
available for trade or purchase on the market.
In 2012 and 2013, 43.75% of the allowances available would be allocated to public utilities (or “local distribution companies” as they
90. See § 700(13)(A)–(C) & (E) (providing proposed covered entities involved in
the cap-and-trade program in 2012).
91. See § 721(c).
92. § 702(4).
93. See generally § 782 (describing emissions allowances).
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are referenced in ACES) for the benefit of their electricity consum94
ers. The percentage of allowances allocated for the benefit of electricity customers would drop to 38.89% in 2014 and 2015, and 35%
95
from 2016 to 2025. From 2026 to 2029, the percentage of allowances
96
allocated to electricity customers would drop annually by 7%. The
number of allowances allocated to a specific public utility would be
50% based on historic emissions and 50% based on annual average
97
retail electricity deliveries. By 2030, no allowances would be allocated for the benefit of electricity customers.
Disposition of Allowances under ACES
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Each covered entity (which includes public utilities) is generally
98
prohibited from emitting GHGs in excess of its allowances. If a covered entity will emit more tons of carbon dioxide equivalents than allotted in a particular year, the covered entity can trade, buy, or bor94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

§ 782(a)(1)(A).
§ 782(a)(1)(B) and (C).
§ 782(a)(1)(D)–(G).
§ 782(b)(2) and (3).
See § 722(a).
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row allowances to comply with ACES.
Each covered entity (which includes public utilities) would be
99
generally prohibited from emitting GHGs in excess of its allowances.
If a covered entity would emit more tons of carbon dioxide equivalents than allotted in a particular year, the covered entity could trade,
buy, or borrow allowances to comply with ACES.
100
Allowances would be tradable. Subject to certain limitations
(not relevant here), a holder of an emissions allowance could “without restriction, sell, exchange, transfer, hold for compliance . . . , or
request that the Administrator [of the EPA] retire the emission allow101
ance.” Thus, a covered entity would be able to buy allowances from
other covered entities that, because of the resources on their system,
did not need all of their allowances in a given year.
Covered entities could also buy allowances from the EPA strategic
102
reserve. Under ACES, the EPA would be directed to create a strategic reserve of allowances, which would contain one to three percent
103
of the quantity of allowances for a certain year. The EPA would auction off the allowances from the strategic reserve on a quarterly ba104
sis. The EPA would auction off approximately 18% of allowances in
2014 and then it would gradually increase this number until 2031
105
when approximately 70% of the allowances would be auctioned.
Finally, covered entities could also bank their allowances to satisfy
106
future compliance. Covered entities could borrow emissions allowances without interest from the calendar year immediately following
107
the compliance year. A covered entity could also borrow some of its
108
own future allowances with a prepayment of interest.

99. See § 722(a).
100. § 724.
101. § 724(a). Even though allowances and offsets are tradable, neither one constitutes a property right. § 721(c)(1).
102. § 726(b)(1).
103. § 726(b)(1)(B).
104. § 726(a)(1). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will regulate the
cash market of allowances and offsets. § 761.
105. See § 726(d) (quantifying the level of allowances released by the reserve per
year).
106. § 725.
107. § 725(c)(1).
108. § 725(c)(2). Under ACES section 725(c)(2)(C), the interest payment is a
portion of emission allowances (i.e., the product of 0.08 and “the number of years
between the calendar year in which the allowance is being used to satisfy a compliance obligation and the [year for which the allowance was originally intended]”).
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b. Offsets
A covered entity could also satisfy compliance by offsetting emissions. Covered entities could obtain offset credits by conducting EPA
certified actions that reduce GHG emissions or increase the amount
109
of GHGs that are sequestered. “Examples of such offset activities
include reducing emissions of methane gas from solid waste landfills,
sequestering GHGs on agricultural lands, rangelands, and forests, altering agricultural tillage practices, planting winter crops, and reduc110
ing the use of nitrogen fertilizer.” A covered entity would get one
offset credit for each carbon dioxide equivalent that “has been re111
duced, avoided, or sequestered.”
c. Cost Recovery Under ACES
Although ACES develops a rigid framework dictating the allocation of benefits associated with carbon allowances to different groups,
112
it does not mandate specific compliance cost policies. This silence
leaves the issue open for possible rulemaking by the EPA or FERC, or
in the absence of such rulemaking, to state regulatory commissions
who have traditionally had jurisdiction over the setting of intrastate
113
retail rates.
One advantage of federal rulemaking on this issue would be the
resulting consistent application of any codified cost recovery or ac114
counting treatment for carbon costs. Where the EPA or FERC is109. See § 731(d) (instructing EPA to create an Offsets Integrity Advisory Board,
which will make recommendations about which offset types will be eligible for compliance purposes). See also § 722 (directing the EPA to give priority to the Advisory
Board recommendations in creating a list of eligible offset project types). Similar to
allowances, an offset can be sold, traded, or transferred unless it has been used or has
expired. § 742.
110. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY ACT OF 2009, COST ESTIMATE 6 (2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10262/hr2454.pdf.
111. H.R. 2454 § 737(b).
112. § 783(b)(5)(A). The silence of ACES is a change from earlier environmental
policy proposals considered by Congress. In 2007, Reps. Udall (D-NM) and Platts (RPA) developed a proposal which would have required state regulatory agencies to pass
through compliance costs resulting from a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard.
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) opposed the
proposal, which was never adopted. Press Release, National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, RPS-Compliance Costs Decisions Best Left to States, NARUC
Tells Congress (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.naruc.org/News/default.cfm?pr=42&pdf.
113. See infra Part III.D.
114. See, e.g., Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Public Utilities and Licensees Subject to the Provisions of the Federal Power Act, 18 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2010)
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sued a rule directing specific regulatory treatment of carbon costs, it
would ensure that the issue would be treated consistently in all subsequent rate-setting proceedings at the state level. However, with the
silence of ACES on this issue, it is not clear whether it is envisioned
115
that either federal agency would have the proper jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether it is considered at the federal or state level,
in making a determination as to who pays for compliance, the enacting provisions of ACES may be helpful. The Act allocates allowances
to retail customers, which suggests an expectation that they will bear
the cost of compliance and thus should receive some of the allowances to offset this burden. Additionally, ACES anticipates that the
distribution of allowances may occur through a rate setting proceeding, which by its nature would involve the consideration of those costs
incurred by the public utility from the provision of electricity ser116
vice.
Ultimately, ACES does not resolve the question of cost recovery,
and prior judicial and state regulatory commission decisions governing ratemaking will likely be the best guide for future treatment of
compliance costs.
C. State Initiatives
1.

Renewable Resource Mandates

Most states have a regulatory commission that regulates the public utilities operating within that state, but the scope of authority and
specific direction given to each entity regarding environmental regu117
lation varies considerably. Some states require the regulatory com-

(offering an example of the uniformity under a federally regulated system, in this
case for public utilities).
115. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 374
(1986) (“While it is certainly true, and a basic underpinning of our federal system,
that state regulation will be displaced to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . . it
is also true that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.”).
116. Before a public utility can receive allowances on behalf of its customers, a
state regulatory commission must, after notice and comment, promulgate a regulation or complete a rate case which fully implements the distribution envisioned in
ACES. H.R. 2454 § 783(b)(6)(A)(i).
117. See, e.g., Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth, Jason Rich & Jason Salmi Klotz,
The Environmental Duties for Public Utilities Commissions for 2006, 7 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9–
69 (2006) (listing each state regulatory commission’s general authority and obligations as provided by statute).
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mission to consider environmental costs when approving a new resource (e.g., a coal plant or high voltage transmission line serving a
118
coal plant). Other state legislatures have enacted provisions that
explicitly prohibit the state regulatory commission from considering
environmental costs when approving a new generation resource or
119
setting rates for retail service.
120
Public utilities increasingly operate in more than one state.
Where two states differ on environmental policy, it creates the potential for inconsistent rate treatment for the public utility that operates
in both. The current inconsistent treatment of environmental externalities (which could include carbon) among states puts the public
utility at risk for stranded costs when it seeks to recover the likely
higher cost of electricity generated from renewable resources con121
sumed by customers in more than one state.
This existing conflict will likely continue for the recovery of carbon-related costs. For example, if the cost associated with carbon
regulation is allocated on a per-customer or usage basis, with the public utility’s customer base straddling more than one state, the disallowance of these costs by one of the state regulatory commissions will
create a stranded cost for the public utility. Depending on the magnitude of the potential stranded costs, the disallowance of prudently incurred costs could also reach constitutional dimensions if it affects the
122
public utility’s ability to earn a reasonable return. Conflicting poli118. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(c) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 402-123(1)(a), (b) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring the commission to give consideration
to the likelihood of new environmental regulations and the risk of higher future costs
associated with the emission of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, when it
considers utility proposals to acquire resources); see also MINN. STAT. § 216B.243 subdivs. 3, 3(a) (2008) (explaining that when a public utility proposes to build a nonrenewable generating plant, the utility must factor in the risk of environmental costs
over the expected useful life of the plant and how the utility plans to allocate those
costs).
119. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-23 (1999) (providing that the North Dakota
Public Utility Commission may not use environmental cost externalities, including
possible costs of complying with future, not yet enacted, environmental laws, in planning or selecting electric resources or establishing rates for service).
120. For example, American Electric Power (AEP) merged with Central and
Southwest Corporation in 2000. Am. Elec. Power Co. & Ctr. Sw. Corp., Opinion No.
442, 90 FERC ¶ 61,242, 61,776 (2000), order on reh’g 91 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2000), aff’d
sub nom. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
AEP currently operates in eleven states: Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. AEP,
About Us, http://www.aep.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
121. See supra notes 118, 119.
122. See infra Part IV.E.
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cies and inconsistent approaches between different states can also
trigger other constitutional concerns, heightening the level of legal
123
and political tensions that can result in inconsistent treatment.
2.

Regional Cap-and-Trade programs

Some state legislatures have also conferred jurisdiction in the
state regulatory commissions to regulate carbon through cap and
trade mechanisms. Two regional cap-and-trade programs currently
dominate in the United States: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia124
tive (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI).
RGGI is the country’s first mandatory regional carbon cap-andtrade program, including ten states located in the eastern part of the
125
United States. In addition, as a mandatory program RGGI is viewed
as the closest model in the United States for a federal cap-and-trade
126
program.
All fossil fueled electric power generation plants located in the
123. For example, the State of North Dakota has announced its intent to bring
suit over the constitutionality of Minnesota’s statute that requires the consideration of
carbon in resource selection, as it creates higher electricity rates for retail customers.
Dale Wetzel, North Dakota Lawsuit Likely Over Minnesota Carbon Dioxide Tax, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/business/nd-lawsuit-likely-over261425.html. This is not the first time that the Minnesota courts have reviewed a policy conflict between Minnesota and North Dakota over the issue of using carbon values. See In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (upholding the MPUC’s order setting carbon dioxide values and deferring a
decision on constitutional issues).
124. See Existing Cap and Trade Programs to Cut Global Warming Emissions, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/
big_picture_solutions/regional-cap-and-trade.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Existing Cap and Trade Programs]. The Midwest Governors’ Association
also commenced a regional climate change policy process. See Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.midwesternaccord.org (last visited Mar. 28,
2010) [hereinafter Midwestern Accord]. If ACES were to be enacted, however, then
these regional cap-and-trade programs would be preempted. See HR. 2454, 111th
Cong. § 861 (2009).
125. Regional
Greenhouse
Gas
Initiative,
About
RGGI,
http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter About RGGI].
The ten participating states include: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
126. See Tracey D. Samuelson, What A National Cap –and-Trade Program Might Look
Like, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-Issues/2009/0627/p25s12-wogi.html (stating that many pieces of RGGI’s
working model have been included in ACES); Hal Weitzman, RGGI: Mandatory Scheme
Makes Modest Gains in North-West, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at 2 (“As Washington has
debated the subject, it has often looked to RGGI as the closest US model for its legislation. The programme’s backers say it has always been intended to be a path to a
federal regime.”).
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ten state region that are greater than twenty-five megawatts are re127
quired to participate, which amounts to approximately 225 generat128
Allowances are allocated to individual states based
ing facilities.
129
primarily on average annual emission occurring from 2002–2004.
The participating states have generally agreed to contribute all of
their allowances to centrally administered auctions and use the
proceeds to fund efficiency improvement and renewable energy
130
projects. Beginning in 2009, regional carbon emissions were capped
at approximately 180 million tons; the cap begins declining by 2.5%
per year in 2015, achieving the program’s overall goal of reducing
131
emissions 10% in 2018.
To date, RGGI has conducted five auc132
tions.
Of the ten states participating in RGGI, two have generically addressed the recovery of resulting carbon costs for the public utilities
operating in their states, and the remaining eight states have adopted
133
retail electric competition. New Hampshire’s enabling statute states
127. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget
Trading Program 2 (Oct. 2007), http://rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf
[hereinafter RGGI Overview]; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, subpart 1.4 (Dec. 31, 2008),
http://rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf
[hereinafter
RGGI Model Rule].
128. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Fact Sheet, http://www.rggi.org/
docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter RGGI Fact Sheet].
129. See RGGI Overview, supra note 127.
130. RGGI Fact Sheet, supra note 128.
131. RGGI Overview, supra note 127.
132. RGGI has auctioned more than 110 million allowances since the first auction
in September 2008, raising $366.5 million. Mary Esch, Greenhouse Gas Auction Nets
$104 Million, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19, 2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/
10521467/greenhouse-gas-auction-nets-104-million.html. “The states are using the
proceeds to weatherize low-income homes, hire and train energy efficiency auditors,
subsidize energy efficiency upgrades for small businesses and educate contractors,
among other things.” Id.
133. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Participating States Regulation,
http://rggi.org/states/state_regulations (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter
RGGI State Regulations] (listing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative participating
states and the specifics for each state’s corresponding regulatory scheme). In these
states, state regulatory commissions still set transmission and distribution rates
charged by public utilities, but they have ceded rate authority over generation to the
competitive markets. Because the RGGI compliance is the responsibility of electric
generators, compliance costs in these states are embedded in the price customers pay
for the generation of electricity. For states that have not implemented retail competition, state regulatory commissions retain jurisdiction over the generation component
of electric service. See Paul Davidson, Shocking Prices Follow Deregulation; States that
Dropped Price Caps Watch and Worry as Rates Soar, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 2007, at 1B (of-
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that RGGI compliance costs are recoverable in default service rates.
Although lacking a specific statute directing its decision, the Vermont
Department of Public Service has also indicated it believes RGGI
135
compliance cost should be recoverable.
Both of these state pronouncements recognize that the compliance costs are legitimate costs
of providing electricity service to be borne by the end user.
In addition to RGGI, seven states in the western United States
136
have also formed a cap-and-trade program. In February 2007, the
governors of five western states entered into an agreement to form the
137
Western Climate Initiative.
Since the original agreement was
signed, two additional states and four Canadian provinces have be138
come fully participating members. In early 2009, WCI circulated
design recommendations for its cap-and-trade program, which are
139
currently under review at the state level.
Under these proposed
plans, sources that emit 25,000 metric tons of carbon annually will be
covered under the WCI program, which is scheduled to commence

fering more information regarding deregulation effects); see also Electricity Basics,
Texas Electric Choice Education Program, http://www.powertochoose.org/
_content/_about/electricity_basics.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (giving background information regarding Texas’ Electric Choice Education Program and offering an example of the competitive market for electricity service in one particular
state); Coping With High Energy Prices, Penn State College of Agricultural Sciences,
http://energy.cas.psu.edu/facts.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (outlining facts and
information about deregulation legislation in Pennsylvania).
134. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-O:28 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (stating that
“all prudently incurred cost of complying” with the RGGI program will be recovered
through the utility’s default service charge).
135. See VERMONT DEPT. OF PUB. SERV., VERMONT COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PLAN
2009, PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT III-81 (May 2008) http://publicservice.vermont.gov/
planning/CEP%20%20WEB%20DRAFT%20FINAL%206-4-08.pdf (stating that
because “the acquisition of these certificates effectively becomes a cost of doing
business for generators, the cost of certificates will become embedded in the market
price for electricity”).
136. See Western Climate Initiative, About the WCI, History,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter WCI History].
137. Id.
138. Id. Current partners include Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington; and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia,
Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. Id. See also Western Climate Initiative, About the
WCI, WCI Partners, www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners (last visited Mar.
28, 2010) [hereinafter WCI Partners].
139. See Western Climate Initiative, Partner Climate Action Plans,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/climate-action-plans (last visited Mar. 28,
2010) (displaying the individual state action plans for participating partners) [hereinafter WCI Climate Action Plans].
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140

January 1, 2012.
One of the WCI participating states has also generically addressed
cost recovery for compliance with the program. The California legislature has mandated that all base-load resources must be as efficient
(on a carbon basis) as a combined-cycle unit, and that the costs of
141
complying with this mandate are to be treated as compliance costs.
D. Non-ACES Federal Agency Rulemaking
Separate from any rulemaking that may occur as a result of passing ACES, the EPA is currently considering rules and findings related
to greenhouse gas emissions. First, on October 30, 2009, the EPA
promulgated a rule that requires certain facilities to report green142
“The data collected by this rule
house gas emissions to the EPA.
will also improve the U.S. government’s ability to formulate climate
policies, and to assess which industries might be affected, and how
143
these industries might be affected by potential policies.” Complying with the proposed rule has related costs, but many public utilities
already track or report greenhouse emissions through EPA voluntary
144
145
partnership programs or through state and regional programs.
Whether such costs are to be recovered in a public utility’s retail rates,
however, is still ultimately subject to the state regulatory commission’s
review and approval.
On December 7, 2009, the EPA Administrator signed findings
that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, endanger public
146
health and welfare. In AEP, discussed above, the Court considered
140. See id. See also WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2008), http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/design-recommendations (describing
the design recommendations for the WCI regional cap-and-trade program) [hereinafter WCI Design Recommendations].
141. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340–41(West Supp. 2010). But see Rebecca Smith
& Keith Johnson, U.S. News: California Ties Cash to Energy, WALL STREET J., Jan. 12,
2010, at A2 (explaining that a state panel proposes to compensate customers for
higher energy prices essentially by collecting an emissions tax and paying the dividends to consumers).
142. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,264–65
(Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89).
143. Id. at 56,265.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 56,266.
146. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 2020(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). The EPA Administrator also found that
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to greenhouse gas pol-

THE
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whether the plaintiff’s nuisance cause of action had been displaced by
147
federal legislation. The Court specifically considered EPA’s (at the
time) proposed endangerment findings and concluded that because
“[a] proposed finding has no effect in law that would affect any rights
148
at issue here” the litigation could proceed. The Court, however,
did not foreclose the possibility that climate change litigation could
be displaced by regulation or legislation in the future — “[i]n sum, at
least until EPA makes the requisite findings, for the purposes of our
displacement analysis the CAA does not (1) regulate greenhouse gas
emissions or (2) regulate such emissions from stationary sources” —
but it refused to opine on the issue were such regulations to be
149
enacted. As such, the EPA’s rules could increase ACES-like compliance costs, but may also reduce the potential for injunction-related
150
costs resulting from a judicial order.
IV. COST RECOVERY FOR CARBON COSTS
For public utilities dependent in any part on coal-fired generation for electricity, the costs of complying with an injunction, federal
cap and trade legislation, or other type of carbon regulation are likely
151
152
to be substantial. Public utilities, however, are regulated entities
lution and threaten public health and welfare. Id. at 66,536. These findings are an
outgrowth of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
147. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 371–88 (2d. Cir.
2009).
148. Id. at 379.
149. Id. at 381.
150. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the EPA will be allowed to
move forward with its regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. See Siobhan
Hughes, Murkowski Holds Out Option of Vote on Plan to block EPA, WALL STREET J., Jan.
12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126332127536126375.html (stating that
Sen. Lisa Murkowski may seek a vote to stop the EPA’s regulations, and that the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce may sue the EPA over its decision to declare greenhouse gases a danger to the public).
151. Current cost estimates for public utilities that are dependent on coal-fired
electric generation are based on their annual carbon emissions. For example, the
largest current estimate is for Southern Co. which produces 149 million tons of CO2 a
year. Such an output would result in a potential $393 million annual cost under
ACES. See Cassandra Sweet, Southern Co. to Lose, Exelon to Gain Under US Cap and
Trade-Study, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid=2009
11021655dowjonesdjonline000389 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). Additionally, utilities
such as Duke and AEP are estimated to incur carbon costs equal to eleven and five
percent of their operating incomes respectively. Posting of John Lorinc to N.Y. Times
Green Inc. Blog, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/209/11/02/winners-and-losersof-cap-and-trade (Nov. 2, 2009, 14:44 EST). It is unlikely that a public utility could
absorb the disallowance of such costs without it affecting their ability to maintain a
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and thus are typically unable to change their retail rates for service to
recoup such costs without first demonstrating to a state regulatory
153
commission that such a change is just and reasonable. Because such
increases in retail rates are quite likely to be significant, they are also
likely to be contested by some stakeholders.
State regulatory commissions will be guided by state law and traditional regulatory principles to determine the reasonableness of a
rate change that includes carbon costs. In that context, state regulatory commissions will also be required to decide the appropriate method of implementing new environmental initiatives (such as ACES),
which will include decisions on the recovery of related costs. On review, such decisions will be compared against long-standing precedent
directing that rates must be reasonable for both customers and public
utilities.
A. Public Utilities: A Business “Affected with a Public Interest”
For most private enterprise, the rates charged for goods and services are determined by competitive forces that reflect market supply
and demand. Public utilities operate as monopolies within a geographic area and generally are not subject to the control of competitive forces. As a result, their rates for service are set through a quasilegislative process involving review by state regulatory commissions
acting under broad powers conferred by the state legislature to determine just and reasonable rates through an examination of the public utility’s costs, which includes approving a reasonable rate of return
on its investment. While the rates set through this process are subject
to judicial review, courts generally give deference to the expertise of
the state regulatory commissions in its determination of fact in rate154
making proceedings.
reasonable return and to attract capital for future investments on reasonable terms.
152. Currently, fourteen states have adopted electric deregulation allowing for
customer choice among electricity service providers. See Status of Electric Restructuring by State, U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2010); see supra note 133 and Part IV (addressing classic rate regulation concepts applicable to public utilities operating in states that have not deregulated electric service).
153. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.03 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 757.282 (West
2003); see also In re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 05-0159, 2006 WL 192550, *35
(Ill. Commerce Comm’n 2006) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2008)); In re Tex. Util.
Elec. Co., No. 11735, 20 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 1029, § XV (Tex. P.U.C. 1994).
154. See, e.g., Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. F.E.R.C., 83 F.3d 1424, 1431 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“Because the subject of our scrutiny is a ratemaking—and thus an agency de-
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It is well established that a state may, under its police power, re155
Because the
gulate a business affected with the public interest.
prime characteristic of a public utility is that of public use or service, a
state may regulate and control a public utility to protect the public interest and to promote the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of its
156
inhabitants. This concept of regulating utility services is well established. In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public
an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he
157
must submit to the control.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court relied heavily on English
common law concepts which preserved in the Crown the right to regulate private property where its use was offered for the public
158
good. The Court also cited to English precedent that found where
a monopoly existed for the public service, the importance of governmental oversight was even more critical to ensuring reasonable terms
159
in the absence of competitive forces.

cision involving complex industry analyses and difficult policy choices—the court will
be particularly deferential to the Commission’s expertise.”) (quoting Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. F.C.C., 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). This deference also applies
generally. See, e.g., Kan. Gas & Elec. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 720 P.2d 1063, 1075
(Kan. 1986) (noting that the KCC “must be afforded a wide discretion in the methodology to be utilized in approaching the complex problems involved. The field of
public utility regulation is a highly complex field and requires a great amount of expertise in arriving at a result which is fair and just to all interested parties.”).
155. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding the right of the state legislature to fix the maximum charge for the storage of grain in public warehouses). See
also Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) (addressing the reasonableness of operating expenses in setting maximum passenger rates for railroad companies).
156. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154 (1937); State v. Traffic
Tel. Worker’s Fed’n of N.J., 66 A. 2d 616 (N.J. 1949); People’s Org. for Wash. Energy
Res. v. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n, 711 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1985).
157. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
158. Id. at 126 (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND, FROM MANUSCRIPTS 45, 78
(Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)).
159. Id. at 127–28 (citing Aldmutt v. Inglis, (1810) 12 East 527, 537 (Eng. Rep.)
(stating that where a monopoly exists, the provider has a duty to perform the service
on reasonable terms).
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B. Traditional Utility Rate Regulation
The principals from historical cases continue to guide the regulation of public utilities, where the regulation of retail rates for service
offered to the public remain subject to the oversight of a state regula160
tory commission. Utility retail rates must be reviewed by the state
regulatory commission and found reasonable before those rates can
be charged to customers. In consideration of the reasonableness of a
rate, the state regulatory commission will examine the costs of operation and the value of the utility property being used, and will deter161
mine a reasonable return on equity.
Rate regulation is based on the cost of providing service to customers. In formulaic terms, the principle of rate regulation can be
expressed as:
R = O + (V – D)*r
R is the total revenue required to recover costs; O represents the
operating costs, like fuel and labor; V is the value of the utility property; D is the accrued depreciation on that property; and r is the rate of
162
return. Thus, a utility is generally allowed to recover operating costs
and its investments in property (e.g., generation facilities). The utility
is also authorized to earn a return on its property investment. Establishment of the total revenue that a utility is authorized to earn involves determination of (1) the costs of operation, (2) the value of the
property minus accrued depreciation (known as rate base), and (3)
163
determination of a reasonable rate of return.
1. The Costs of Operation and Rate Base
Operating expenses must be considered in determining whether
164
rates are reasonable and provide a fair return to a public utility.
“[T]he Commission must examine every aspect of the [public] utility’s operations and the economic environment in which the utility

160. It is well established that the state regulatory commissions retain authority to
regulate intrastate retail rates for utility service. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1964); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam
& Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 91 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., In re Municipality of Anchorage, 19 P.U.R.4th 278, 281–82, 288
(Alaska P.U.C. 1977).
162. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 255.
163. Id. See also State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina Utils. Customers Ass’n, 524
S.E.2d 10, 17–18 (N.C. 2000).
164. Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 733 A.2d 996, 999
(Md. 1999).
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functions to ensure that the [current or operating expense] data it
has received [from the public utility] are representative of operating
165
In that
conditions that will, or should, prevail in future years.”
process, the state regulatory commission will determine what specific
166
charges and expenses to allow as costs of operation.
A public utility’s “rate base” is the amount of investment on
which it is entitled to an opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. It represents the total investment in, or the fair value of, the
used and useful property that it necessarily devotes to rendering the
167
regulated services.
In general, prudently incurred costs for operations and investments related to the provision of electricity service are included in retail rates as part of the cost of generating the electricity used by cus168
tomers. The courts, however, have not set out specific line items to
be included in retail electric rates as reasonable costs.
The exact definition of prudence used when examining the public utility’s decisions may vary by jurisdiction, but generally involves a
review of the public utility’s actions at the time a decision was made
169
that resulted in incurring a cost or making an investment. Such a
determination is not intended to be a substitution of judgment for
that of the public utility’s managers, and must be supported by a finding that the public utility knew or should have known that its actions

165. U. S. Gypsum, Inc. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc., 735 N.E.2d 790, 798 (Ind. 2000) (citing City of Evansville v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 339 N.E.2d 562, 570–71 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975)).
166. See Ford Motor Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 562 N.W.2d 224, 229–30 (Mich.
1997) (allowing utility to begin amortizing expenses accrued during a prior year for
postretirement benefits was not unlawful or unreasonable).
167. See Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U.S.
276, 291(1923); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Del. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 705 A.2d 1059,
1066 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); City of Miami v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 208 So. 2d 249
(Fla. 1968); Heater of Seabrook, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of S.C., 503 S.E.2d 739,
741–42 (S.C. 1998).
168. See, e.g., Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1922) (explaining that state and federal taxes are operating costs); Bus. & Prof’l People v. Ill.
Commerce Comm’n, 585 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1991) (explaining that fuels costs are perhaps the most significant operating expenses).
169. For example, one state regulatory commission defined this review as:
The company’s conduct should be judged by asking whether the conduct
was reasonable at the time, under all of the circumstances, considering that
the company had to solve its problems prospectively rather than in reliance
on hindsight. In effect, our responsibility is to determine how reasonable
people would have performed the task that confronted the company.
PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 341 (citing In re Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., No. 79-1, at 5–6
(N.Y. 1979)).
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170

were imprudent at the time of its decision. Absent a showing of imprudence, the public utility is presumed to have acted in good
171
faith.
2. Rate of Return
Generally, a public utility secures a fair return when its revenues
are sufficient to pay operating expenses, to attract new investors, and
172
to pay a fair return to its existing investors. Rates fixed by state regulatory commissions that are not sufficient to yield a fair or reasonable return to a public utility are considered to be unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and their enforcement will deprive the public
utility company of its property in violation of the Federal Constitu173
tion. In this respect, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution safeguard private property against a taking for
public use, and neither the nation nor the state may take such property of a public utility by means of the fixing of rates or charges that do
not allow the public utility a reasonable rate of return upon the value
of its property. In determining the reasonable rate of return on rate
base, two U.S. Supreme Court cases remain seminal authorities on
this issue.
a. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public
Service Commission
In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commis174
sion, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a list of factors to be considered when setting a just and reasonable rate of return that have since
been applied by federal and state regulatory commissions. Bluefield
Water Works & Improvement Company provided water to Bluefield,
170. Id. at 340–41 (citing In re W. Mass. Elec. Co., 80 P.U.R.4th 479, 501(Mass.
D.P.U. 1986)).
171. W. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935) (“In
the absence of a showing of inefficiency or improvidence, a court will not substitute
its judgment for theirs as to the measure of a prudent outlay.”).
172. United Water Del., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 723 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del.
1999) (citing Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State of Del. v. Wilmington Suburban Water
Corp., 467 A.2d 446, 447 (Del. 1983)); In re Petition of PNM Gas Servs., 1 P.3d 383,
391 (N.M. 2000).
173. See West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Balt. City, 295 U.S. 662, 668–
69 (1935); Ga. Power Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 396 S.E.2d 562, 580–81 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990); KN Energy, Inc. v. Cities of Broken Bow, 505 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Neb.
1993).
174. Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S.
679 (1923).
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175

West Virginia. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia set
rates for the Bluefield Water Works considering lower construction
costs in 1915 before World War I, instead of the higher construction
costs in 1920 when Bluefield Water Works applied for the rate in176
crease. The company challenged the Public Service Commission’s
177
Blurate order in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
efield Water Works argued that the order violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it denied Blue Water Works property without
178
just compensation and without due process of law. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied relief and dismissed the
179
case. Bluefield Water Works appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme
180
Court.
In holding that the rate of return on Bluefield Water Works’ in181
vestment was too low and thus confiscatory, the Court explained:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to
earn a return on the value of the property which it employs
for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of
the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are
realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
182
speculative ventures.
The Court continued, “The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and
should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money ne183
cessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.” Bluefield Water
Works, along with Hope, continue today to provide the basic standard
for the determination of the rate of return on rate base.

175. Id. at 683.
176. Id. at 689.
177. Id. at 683.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 695. The Court also held that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the higher costs of construction after World War I.
Id. at 692. This error is related, but not central to, the Court’s holding on the rate of
return discussed infra notes 1822 and 1833 and related text.
182. Bluefield Water Works, 262 U.S. at 692–93.
183. Id. at 693. Cf. Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (refusing
to extend Bluefield Water Works’s holding to a business failure due to economic forces).
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b. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.

184

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Power Commission v.
185
Hope Natural Gas Co. involved the Court’s consideration of a rate order issued under the Natural Gas Act by the Federal Power Commis186
sion.
In 1938, the cities of Cleveland and Akron, Ohio filed complaints
with the Federal Power Commission (FPC) alleging that the rates being collected by Hope Natural Gas Company through an affiliate dis187
tributing natural gas in Ohio were excessive and unreasonable.
Later that same year, the FPC instituted an investigation to determine
188
the reasonableness of the rates charged. In 1939, the Public Utility
Commission of Pennsylvania also filed a complaint with the FPC
charging that the rates collected by Hope Natural Gas Company
through an affiliate for natural gas service in Pennsylvania were un189
reasonable. At the conclusion of its investigation in 1942, the FPC
issued an order requiring a $3,609,857 annual reduction in future
rates, and established “just and reasonable” rates for each of the five
190
affiliate companies providing retail natural gas service.
The FPC had found that 6.5% was a fair rate of return on the
191
company’s investment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
192
set aside the FPC’s order.
In Hope, the Supreme Court reversed.
The New Hope Gas Company failed to convince the Court that the
FPC’s Order provided the company an unjust and unreasonable re193
turn on its investment.
184. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 593. The Federal Power Commission was the predecessor to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7382f (2008)). Even
though Hope focuses specifically on the Natural Gas Act, it has broader implications
because the Court further defined the meaning of “just and reasonable” rates. Hope,
320 U.S. at 617.
187. Id. at 594.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 594–95.
190. Id. at 595. In addition, the FPC established an interstate rate base of
$33,712,526 that it found “represented the ‘actual legitimate cost’ of the company’s
interstate property less depletion and depreciation and plus unoperated acreage,
working capital and future net capital additions.” Id. at 596.
191. Id. at 599.
192. Id. at 599–600.
193. Id. at 605. See also id. at 602 (explaining that rate orders by the commission
carry a presumption of validity “[a]nd he who would upset the rate order under the
Act carries the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because
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While the Court did not cite Bluefield Water Works specifically, the
Court echoed its holding:
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of
“just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the investor and consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not insure
that the business shall produce net revenues.” But such
considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate
concern with the financial integrity of the company whose
rates are being regulated. From the investor of company
point of view it is important that there be enough revenue
not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs
of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence
in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain
194
its credit and to attract capital.
C. Recovery of Carbon-Related Costs
The potential costs incurred by public utilities to comply with
carbon initiatives are not discretionary, but rather will be a fixed requirement of their continued operations. As such, the determination
of whether those costs should be included in retail rates is not just a
determination of whether the public utility was prudent in incurring
the expense; it must also recognize that the expense is a critical component of providing electricity service to its customers.
1. Injunction Costs
If a public utility is enjoined from emitting carbon, it will have an
immediate and dramatic impact on its operations. To meet the demand of its customers for electricity, it will need to purchase replacement power that is carbon neutral while it determines a new resource
plan. Carbon-neutral replacement power is likely to be more costly
than the power generated from the coal-fired generation that it will
195
replace. Ultimately, the public utility will also likely incur costs reit is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences”) (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
195. See LAZARD, LTD., LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS —VERSION 2.0 (2008),
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/2008%20EMP%20Levelized%20Cost
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lated to building new generation facilities or modifying existing facilities to generate electricity from a resource that emits less carbon.
Unless shown to be imprudent, costs for purchasing power and
building and maintaining generation facilities have traditionally been
196
included in the cost of service and included in rates. In judging the
prudency of the decision to incur costs, the state regulatory commissions examine the circumstances under which the public utility made
197
the decision to incur the cost. Because the decision to incur a cost
will be the direct result of the public utility’s compliance with a judicial order, the prudency of the costs should be viewed in the context
of ensuring continued power supply for customers under the conditions set forth by the court. Therefore, while these decisions may increase the cost of service and ultimately rates, the resulting costs
should be recoverable.
2. Compliance Costs
If ACES or a similar federal carbon regulation is enacted, a public
utility will have to consider the options previously outlined or purchase carbon allowances to comply with the new regulation. Including the costs of carbon allowances in ratemaking would be consistent
with the precedent supporting the recovery of compliance costs
198
stemming from emission reduction and other environmental costs
and the specific cost-recovery policies in some of the RGGI/WCI
states.
For example, implementation of amendments to the Clean Air
Act (CAA) resulted in a number of cases that confirmed the inclusion
of costs resulting from the public utility’s compliance with federal en199
vironmental regulation in the determination of retail rates. These
%20of%20Energy%20-%20Master%20June%202008%20(2).pdf.
196. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.1636 (2008) (allowing recovery of electric utility
infrastructure costs when a project replaces or modifies existing infrastructure and is
shown to conserve energy or use energy more efficiently); MINN. STAT. § 216B.1645
(2008) (allowing recovery of purchase power costs from ratepayers of utility, to the
extent they are not offset by certain utility revenues); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
197. See supra Part IV.B.
198. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
199. See Fla. Cities Water Co. v. State, 705 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that the utility commission must add the cost of environmental improvements that are required by federal or state government regulations to the rate
base, to the extent that these improvements were made “in the public interest”); In re
Conn. Light & Power Co., 191 P.U.R.4th 373, 494 (Conn. P.U.C. 1999) (allowing the
utility to recover, in its rate base, costs incurred in purchasing emissions allowances
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decisions acknowledge that while the state regulatory commissions
have jurisdiction over retail intrastate rates, compliance with federal
laws or regulations is generally considered a reasonable cost of operation. Carbon regulation is thus analogous to CAA regulation of other
emissions.
Additionally, the carbon regulation process outlined in ACES is
analogous to a type of environmental tax on generation. Public utilities have traditionally recovered validly imposed taxes as operating
200
expenses for rate-making purposes, including property tax paid for
201
a generation facility. The recognition of this expense in retail rates
is based on the fact that payment of a legitimate tax is a requirement
of the public utility’s continued operation of that facility. Absent
compliance, the facility would be closed. The regulation of carbon
under ACES would have a similar impact on generation facilities.
Operating costs can also include costs for items not actually used
in the generation of electricity if such items are found to be necessary
for the operation of the generation plant. In Senior Citizens Coalition of
202
Northeastern Minnesota v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the costs of constructing public
recreational facilities were a necessary part of generating electricity
203
service from three hydroelectric plants. While the record reflected
that the recreational facilities were not actually used in the generation
of electricity or as part of the public utility’s generation or transmission facilities, they were required as a condition of the hydroelectric
204
license granted by FERC. The court found that such facilities were
for compliance with federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990); In re Ky. Utils. Co.,
242 P.U.R.4th 301, 315 (Ky. P.S.C. 2005) (holding that utility can recuperate, through
a surcharge, money spent on emissions allowances necessary to comply with Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990). But see In re Duke Energy Corp., 210 P.U.R.4th 311, 323
(N.C. U.C. 2001) (holding that expenses related to purchase of federal emissions allowances cannot be charged as fuel costs).
200. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); Miller v. R.R.
Comm’n, 70 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1937); Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 733 A.2d 996 (Md. 1999); Minnegasco v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 549
N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 1996).
201. See In re Consumers Energy Co., 222 P.U.R.4th 303, 306 (Mich. P.S.C. 2002)
(citing In re Provisions of § 10a(10) of 2000 PA 141, No. U-12639, 2001 WL 96161,
exs. S-23, S-25, S-27, S-29 (Mich. P.S.C. Jan. 4, 2001)) (noting that plant property taxes
are included in the category of “fixed costs”—along with generation and related
regulatory assets, and production-related depreciation and amortization—that is recoverable through rate base via stranded cost computation); see also In re Detroit Edison Co., No. U-13350, 2003 WL 21791601, at *1 (Mich. P.S.C. July 31, 2003).
202. 355 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1984).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 299–300.
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useful due to their mandatory nature, and stated:
The problem with the PUC’s reasoning is that it defined
“used . . . in rendering service” to require that an item must
actually generate, transmit or distribute electricity, or aid in
doing so. We reject that definition as being overly technical
and inflexible. . . . Under general principles of utility law,
the “used and useful” standard simply requires (1) that the
property be “in service,” and (2) that it “be ‘reasonably necessary’ to the efficient and reliable provision of utility service.” Thus, where, as here, an item of property is necessary
for the continued operation of an electric generating facility
according to valid federal licensing standards, we hold that
205
such an item is “used and useful” . . . .
Under the reasoning in Senior Citizens Coalition, the costs of purchasing carbon allowances should be included in the cost of service
because purchasing an allowance is necessary for the continued operation of the plant. Absent cost recovery, the public utility is placed in
the position of having to choose between compliance with federal
regulations and being able to afford such compliance.
Similarly, mandated pollution-control facilities are not essential
for the actual generation of electricity, but there is precedent support206
ing the inclusion of such costs in rates. In some states, these costs
are explicitly recoverable from customers through rate riders autho207
rized by statute.
Further, disallowance of the cost of complying with federal carbon regulations will frustrate the purpose of those regulations by
creating a related financial penalty for the public utility’s compliance.
Past treatment of this issue has been to include the costs of com208
pliance in rates. Accordingly, if a public utility chooses to modify an
existing coal-fired generation plant to use another resource that emits
less carbon, or invest in other technology to reduce its carbon output,
such costs should be considered in light of that utility’s overall efforts
to comply with federal carbon emission regulations. Otherwise, the
205. Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
206. See Senior Citizens Coal. of Ne. Minn. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 355
N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 1984); Green v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 473 A.2d 209, 213–
14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); In re Ky. Utils. Co., 242 P.U.R.4th 301, 315 (Ky. P.S.C.
2005) (authorizing the utility to recover costs associated with constructing four scrubbers and for any new or additional pollution control equipment).
207. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.683 (2008) (allowing cost recovery for additional
costs in related to mercury reduction); MINN. STAT. § 216B.1692 (2008) (providing
recovery of costs related to a qualifying emissions-reductions project).
208. See supra notes 199, 206–07 and accompanying text.
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disallowance of cost can have a chilling effect on its capital invest209
ments, which could include new technologies that are necessary to
210
substantively address the issue of climate change. In such an outcome, the negative effects of a regulatory disallowance would be felt
by a broader group than just public utilities and their customers, and
would likely also impact the environmental cause that the carbon policy is meant to help.
Finally, the examples found in the RGGI or WCI states that explicitly allow compliance costs to be recovered through retail rates confirm the necessity of providing public utilities with the means of recovering costs associated with carbon compliance in order to give effect
211
to their carbon policy initiatives.
The states of Vermont, New
Hampshire, and California all explicitly allow recovery of costs of
212
complying with regional greenhouse gas initiates. These state statutes and regulatory pronouncements confirm that the need to ensure cost recovery is inseparable from effective carbon regulation. If,
however, stakeholders advocate against the inclusion of costs stemming from ACES in ratemaking, the outcome may violate state laws
213
that allow for the recovery of prudently incurred costs and raise
209. See Katarzyna Klimasinska, FPL Falls After Florida Ruling in Rate Case (Update 1),
BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-14/fplfalls-after-florida-ruling-in-utility-rate-case-update2-.html (stating that FPL Group Inc.
would suspend $10 billion in capital projects in Florida over the next five years after
state regulators denied nearly all of its requested $1.3 billion rate increase request);
Press Release, Florida Power & Light (FPL), Citing Deteriorating Regulatory Environment, FPL Halts Billions of Dollars in Capital Expenditures in Florida (Jan. 13,
2009), http://www.fpl.com/news/2010/011310.shtml.
210. Press Release, Duke Energy, Duke Energy Tests Solar Panels and New Smart
Grid Technology in Charlotte (June 16, 2009), http://www.dukeenergy.com/news/releases/2009061602.asp; Press Release, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,
PG&E to Study Wave Power In Humboldt & Mendocino (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.pge.com/about/news/mediarelations/newsreleases/q1_2007/070228.sh
tml; Press Release, Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy Launches Groundbreaking Wind-toBattery
Project
(Feb.
28,
2008),
http://www.xcelenergy.com/Colorado/Company/Newsroom/News%20Releases/Pa
ges/Xcel_Energy_launches_groundbreaking_wind_to_battery_project.aspx; Press Release, Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy Announces Six-Month Test Drive of Plug-in Hybrid
Electric
Vehicles
(Oct.
22,
2007),
http://www.xcelenergy.com/New%20Mexico/Company/Newsroom/News%20Relea
ses/Pages/Xcel_Energy_announces_six_month_test_drive_of_plug_in_hybrid_electri
c_vehicles.aspx.
211. See supra Part III.C.2.
212. See supra notes 134, 135, 141 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 4-101(3) (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 460.06a(2)–(7) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. § 216B.16, subdiv. 6 (2008); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-211 to -213 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED
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214

D. Mitigating Rate Impact
All commentators agree that ACES will increase the cost for
energy and energy-intensive goods and services; the debate among
215
them is in regard to the amount that increase may take. Estimates
range from $98 to $3100 per household annually, leaving one certainty: the impact of ACES will be significant. The impacts from other
types of carbon regulation discussed in this article have not been similarly estimated but are also likely to be significant.
ACES itself appears to acknowledge the rate impact potential by
offering two forms of customer relief: (1) the bill allocates more than
one-third of the total allowances to retail natural gas and electric utility companies to provide their customers with relief on their utility
bills; (2) proceeds from the sale of fifteen percent of the emissions allowances to provide targeted assistance to low-income households for
the higher costs they will face for energy and energy-intensive goods
216
and services. Whether these measures are sufficient to fully mitigate
the scope of expected rate increases will vary depending on the facts
of each individual case.
The issue of mitigating rate impact resulting from cap and trade
regulation has been raised previously in the context of RGGI and
WCI. In New York, the state legislature is considering a bill that
would allocate $112 million received from auctioning carbon credits
under RGGI to subsidize home energy-efficiency renovations for
energy customers, thus reducing energy usage and the related
217
amount owed for benefiting households. California has a proposal
to contribute seventy-five percent of an expected $20 billion in annual
LAWS § 49-34A-100 (Supp. 2009); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 36.051, 36.052 (Vernon
2007).
214. See infra Part IV.E.
215. See D’Angelo Gore, Cap-And-Trade Cost Inflation, FACTCHECK.ORG, May 28,
2009, http://www.factcheck.org/2009/05/cap-and-trade-cost-inflation/ (quoting various cap and trade cost estimates); see also Op-Ed, Who Pays for Cap and Trade? WALL
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A18 (stating that a 15% cut in carbon emissions would result in
price increases of $680, or 3.3% of after-tax income for households in the bottomincome quintile, $800 and $1,500, or 2.9% to 2.7% for the three middle quintiles,
and a 1.7% increase for the top quintile).
216. American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 782
(2009).
217. Posting of Steve Zweig to HeatingOil.com, http://www.heatingoil.com/
blog/york-bill-cap-trade-income-energysaving-projects/#more-2600 (Sept. 15, 2009,
15:48 EST).
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revenue from the state’s proposed cap-and-trade measures back to
218
state residents. The California proposal addresses many of the concerns surrounding carbon regulation, including the expectation that
an energy tax will have the greatest impact on low-income households
219
in that state. These efforts and others are clearly a response to the
increases expected in energy and energy-intensive goods and services
from carbon regulation.
If ACES is enacted, or other forms of carbon regulation result in
significant costs, the impact to electricity customers should be considered holistically in order to determine whether these or other measures should occur to mitigate the potential for rate impact. In that
debate, the state regulatory commissions are well situated to convene
a generic stakeholder proceeding to consider such mitigating options
as increases in customer aid for low-income and fixed-income customers, conservation assistance, and timing any rate increase with
credits. Ideally, a comprehensive approach would be determined
prior to the need for a rate increase request by a public utility operating in the state. Such coordination would facilitate the state regulatory commission’s full consideration of both the rate increase and the
existing options for mitigating the potential for negative consequences to customers of the related rate impact.
E. The Constitutional Significance of the Result
If a state regulatory commission order were to exclude costs resulting from carbon regulation from the public utility’s cost of service,
the reasonableness of such a decision would generally be reviewed
220
under state law or traditional regulatory standards. If, however, the
financial result of an adverse regulatory decision is significant, affecting the risk to the public utility’s investors, it may also raise constitu218. Posting of Margot Roosevelt to L.A. Times Greenspace Blog,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/01/cap-and-trade-california.html
(Jan. 11, 2010, 17:23 PST) (citing a report from an advisory committee to the California Air Resources Board).
219. Rebecca Smith & Keith Johnson, California: May Pay Consumers for Carbon
Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at A2 (stating that a family of four would receive an
estimated $388 in 2012, rising to $1036 by 2020).
220. Deference is generally shown by a reviewing court to a state regulatory agency’s determination of facts related to its area of expertise. See Reserve Mining Co. v.
Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1977) (finding that an agency’s expertise is entitled to deference from reviewing courts and that the agency’s decision is presumed
correct); Brinks, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 446, 449 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (stating that substantial deference is accorded to the fact finding process
of an administrative agency); see also supra note 154.
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tional issues.
In Hope, the Supreme Court focused on the result of the rate review, rather than the process by which the rates were analyzed, and
emphasized that the end result was critical in determining the reasonableness of rates:
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police
power, may reduce the value of the property which is being
regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not
mean that the regulation is invalid. It does, however, indicate that “fair value” is the end product of the process of
rate-making, not the starting point as the Circuit Court of
Appeals held. The heart of the matter is that the rates cannot be made to depend upon “fair value” when the value of
the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever
221
rates may be anticipated.
In explaining its focus, the Court drew an important distinction
between adherence to a particular formula and the actual impact of
the rate order. If the total effect of the rate order is not unreasonable, the Court determined that any subsequent judicial inquiry on
constitutional grounds as to the method used to reach that result was
at an end. The fact that the method employed may contain what it
222
termed as “infirmities” was unimportant.
In examining the effect of the FPC’s order on Hope Natural Gas
Company, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,
determining that the rates authorized were just and reasonable, holding that “[r]ates which enable the company to operate successfully, to
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate
its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as
invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the
223
so-called ‘fair value’ rate base.”
The conclusion literally drawn from this language is that a state
regulatory commission need not use any specific standard for the determination of the value of rate base nor allow recovery of specific operating expenses to satisfy constitutional requirements, so long as the
end reached is reasonable.
Forty-five years after Hope, the Supreme Court issued another crit221. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 601 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 602; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989)
(citing Hope to affirm that the fact that “the method employed to reach that result
may contain infirmities is not then important”).
223. Hope, 320 U.S. at 319.
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ical opinion on the constitutional standards for review of regulated
224
rates in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, which involved the state public
utilities commission decision to allow the inclusion of costs incurred
by two power company participants to a joint venture formed to build
225
seven nuclear power plants. Four of the seven planned plants ultimately were not built and were not used in the provision of electricity
to customers. On appeal, the Consumer Advocate argued against the
inclusion of costs associated with these canceled plants in rates for
electricity because these plants were never “used and useful” in ser226
vice to the public. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with
the arguments raised by the Consumer Advocate and reversed the de227
cision of the Commonwealth Court. In doing so, the court rejected
the power company’s arguments that disallowing rate recovery would
228
constitute an unlawful taking and was unconstitutional.
In affirming the Pennsylvania court, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its past statements in Hope that the effect of the decision, not
229
its components, determined its constitutional status. The Court did
not absolve the state regulatory commission of its obligation to make a
sound decision based on a developed record, so much as acknowledge
that the only way to evaluate the soundness of that decision is to weigh
the effect of the final outcome:
The economic judgments required in rate proceedings are
often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result. The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate
these economic niceties. Errors to the detriment of one party may well be canceled out by countervailing errors or allowances in another part of the rate proceeding. The Constitution protects the utility from the net effect of the rate
order on its property. Inconsistencies in one aspect of the
methodology have no constitutional effect on the utility’s
property if they are compensated by countervailing factors
230
in some other aspect.
In Duquesne, the Court found that neither power company had al224. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
225. Id. at 305. In 1980 and 1981, Duquesne Light Company sought to amortize
over a ten-year period $34,697,389 in costs related to the canceled power plants. Id.
at 302. Penn Power also sought the opportunity to amortize $9,569,665 over a tenyear period for similar costs. Id. at 304.
226. Cohen v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 494 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
227. Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 532 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1987).
228. Dusquesne, 488 U.S. at 305.
229. Id. at 310.
230. Id. at 314.
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leged that the total effect of the rate order was either unjust or unreasonable, and that the overall effect was well within the bounds of Hope
even with the total exclusion of the costs associated with the canceled
231
plants.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s deci232
sion.
After Hope and Duquesne, the determinative question on review of
a rate order issued by a state regulatory commission is not whether a
specific cost was prudently incurred and useful in the provision of service, but whether the omission of that cost by the state regulatory
commission triggered an overall result that is so unreasonable as to
confiscate property in violation of the Takings Clause under either
233
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Not all costs excluded by a state regulatory commission in rate
making proceedings rise to this level. The anticipated costs resulting
from the implementation of a federal cap-and-trade regulation, however, are estimated to be considerable. Denial of costs representing a
significant amount of a public utility’s annual income could implicate
constitutional protections.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, operating costs associated with the production of
electricity have been included in the rate making process overseen by
234
the state regulatory commissions. The inclusion of these costs recognizes that public utilities provide a service to customers for which
they should be compensated. Where the federal or state government
has implemented environmental restrictions on the generation of
electricity, these costs have been included in the calculation of retail
231. Id. at 311. Duquesne was authorized to earn a 16.14% return on common
equity and an 11.64% overall return on a rate base of nearly $1.8 billion. Id. Its $35
million investment in the cancelled plants comprised of roughly 1.9% of its total base,
and the denial of plant amortization reduced its annual allowance by 0.4%. Id. at
312.
232. Id. at 316.
233. Id. at 307–08 (citing Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164
U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (declaring that a rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the
value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so
doing “practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due process of law”));
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–392 (1974) (“All that is protected against, in a
constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level.”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) (“By long
standing usage in the field of rate regulation, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one
which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense.”).
234. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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rates paid by customers to give effect to those regulations. Including these costs in retail rates recognizes that environmental policies
will not be successful without also providing a means for the affected
utility to continue to provide service and earn a reasonable return.
At this point, the ultimate cost impacts of carbon initiatives are
far from clear and depend largely on individual facts and future action by courts, Congress, federal agencies, and state regulatory com236
missions. But the issue of cost recovery is of critical importance to
the success of any carbon regulation. Without assurances that these
costs will be recognized for ratemaking purposes, public utilities face
considerable risks related to their investment status and, as a result,
the future costs of their operations. Thus, it is crucial that a comprehensive approach to cost recovery should be developed. This comprehensive approach can be developed through the Senate’s consideration of ACES (or similar federal legislation), subsequent
rulemaking by federal agencies, or through consistent application by
the state regulatory commissions in regulatory ratemaking proceedings.
Also important is recognizing that the recovery of carbon regulation costs will significantly increase the rates paid by electricity cus237
tomers.
This issue cannot be effectively managed by disallowing
cost recovery for such costs. While a disallowance of cost may temporarily reduce the potential rate impact for customers, it would also
have significant impacts on the public utility’s operations and result in
potential judicial challenges. Additionally, the public utility would
likely see a degradation of its credit status, which will necessarily result
in increases to the cost of credit and investment and, ultimately, higher retail rates. The public utility may also have to suspend its capital
investments, including any investments in new technologies that are
necessary to address the issue of climate change. A better alternative
is to consider both the rate increase and rate impact mitigation (such
as ACES allowances) together. This allows for the development of a
comprehensive implementation strategy that supports full realization
of the environmental policy.
For these reasons, efforts to mitigate the impact of carbon regulation on public utilities and electricity customers should not occur piecemeal or on an ad hoc basis, but as a part of a holistic approach to
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implementing new federal policy on carbon regulation. The ultimate
success of such legislation will depend on a consistent solution.
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